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Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes:
Are Athletes Being Denied Their
Constitutional Rights?*
In order to win the war against drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of the
Constitution in the battle.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980's, drug use and abuse by amateur and profes-
sional athletes alike has prompted an increased awareness of the po-
tential hazards to health and ethics. For example, the cocaine
problem of Steve Howe, Los Angeles Dodger pitcher, received media
attention1 continuously from 1985 until he was eventually suspended
from major league baseball in 1986.2
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) recognized the exist-
ence of drug problems in amateur athletics as early as the 1960's. 3
However, not until the 1983 Pan American Games in Caracas, Vene-
zuela, did an IOC drug testing program commence. 4 The Caracas
games received extensive media coverage when fifteen athletes tested
positive for drug use and numerous others withdrew from competi-
tion to avoid possible suspension.5 More recently, the tragic deaths of
Len Bias6 and Don Rogers 7 have brought public attention to the ter-
rible problem of drug use and abuse in collegiate athletics. As a re-
* For LEXIS® computerized research regarding the constitutionality of
mandatory drug testing of student athletes, select the GENFED library, COURTS file;
the STATES library, OMNI file; and the LAWREV library, ALLREV file. For each
selection, the author suggests the following searches: (1) constitution! w/30 drug/ w/5
test! and employ! or athlet!; (2 drug w/10 test! w/30 student or school or college or
university w/30 privacy and search; and (3) constitution! w/20 drug w/5 test! and
student or school or athlet!. LEXIS@ is a registered trademark of Mead Data Central,
Inc.
t Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
1. L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § III, at 1, col. 2.
2. Id., May 16, 1986, § III, at 1, col. 6.
3. Clarke, Sports Medicine and Drug Control Programs of the U.S. Olympic Com-
mittee, 73 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 740, 741, No. 5, pt. 2 (Supp. May 1984);
see also Beckett, Use and Abuse of Drugs in Sport, 1981 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI., Supp. 7, 163,
164.
4. Clarke, supra note 3, at 741; see also Voy, Education as a Means Against Dop-
ing, TEAM HANDBALL USA, Jan. 1988, at 19, 20.
5. Neff, Caracas: A Scandal and a Warning, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1983,
at 18, 19.
6. McCallum, The Cruelest Thing Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 30, 1986, at 20.
sult, drug programs established by athletic federations and
associations to help educate athletes on the harmful consequences of
drug use and abuse have gained widespread recognition.
However, recreational drug use is not the only problem facing to-
day's athletes. An increasing emphasis on being the strongest and
fastest competitor has caused many athletes to resort to doping.8
Doping is "the administering or use of substances in any form alien
to the body or of physiological substances in abnormal amounts and
with abnormal methods by healthy persons with the exclusive aim of
attaining artificial and unfair increase of performance in competi-
tion."9 More simply put, "[d]oping comprises the administration of
medications--or--the use of other means to artificially increase an
athlete's competitive performance."o The most common methods of
doping are blood doping" and the use of anabolic steroids.12 Studies
on steroid use and blood doping reveal that athletes utilizing these
techniques can enhance their performance.' 3 However, the side ef-
fects of steroids as well as those of recreational drug use are
dangerous.14
At the age of 22, Len Bias died from cocaine overdose the day after he had fulfilled his
dream by signing a professional basketball contract with the Boston Celtics. Id.
7. Keteyian & Selecraig, A Killer Drug Strikes Again, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July
7, 1986, at 18. Don Rogers of the Cleveland Browns, a UCLA All-American football
player and 1984 American Football Conference rookie of the year, died from a cocaine
overdose just one day before he was to marry his college sweetheart. Id.
8. Sanoff, Drug Problem in Athletics: It's Not Only the Pros, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 64.
9. Oseid, Doping and Athletes-Prevention and Counseling, 73 J. ALLERGY &
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY (pt. 2) 735, 735, No. 5, (Supp. May 1984).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 736; see also Voy, supra note 4, at 20. Because red blood cells have a
higher oxygen content than white, athletes extract blood during training, separate the
red cells from the white, and freeze the red cells in order to preserve them. C. KLAFS
& D. ARNHEIM, MODERN PRINCIPLES OF ATHLETIC TRAINING 163 (5th ed. 1981) [herein-
after KLAFS]. Immediately before competition, these red cells are intraveneously in-
jected into the athlete. Id. This procedure increases the athlete's stamina and
improves performance. Id.; see also NCAA, THE 1987-88 NCAA DRUG TESTING PRO-
GRAM (1987) (pamphlet) [hereinafter NCAA PROGRAM].
12. Oseid, supra note 9, at 736; see also Voy, supra note 4, at 20. Steroids are
growth hormones, such as testosterone, which can be injected or taken orally. Former
Husker Fesses Up, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 24; see also NCAA PROGRAM,
supra note 11, at 9. Athletes use anabolic steroids to increase muscle mass. KLAFS,
supra note 11, at 162. Additionally, anabolic steroids can increase one's aggressiveness
and competitiveness. Beckett, supra note 3, at 166.
13. Sanoff, supra note 8, at 66. But see Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988). Although it is believed that blood doping enhances an
athlete's performance, "there is no scientific evidence to show that anabolic steroids
will enhance performance in any athlete." Id. at 16, 18.
14. Oseid, supra note 9, at 736. Prolonged steroid use can cause "liver damage, tes-
ticular atrophy, infertility and heart disease." Sanoff, supra note 8, at 64. The side ef-
fects upon women taking steroids containing testosterone include "disrupt[ing] the
menstrual cycle, caus[ing] growth of facial hair and deepen[ing] the voice." ICE; see also
KLAFS, supra note 11, at 162.
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In an effort to combat both recreational and performance enhanc-
ing drug use, athletic federations and associations currently test ath-
letes for drugs and impose stiff sanctions on those found to be
users.'5 This comment will focus on collegiate athletics and the
mandatory drug testing programs implemented by the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and individual universities and
colleges. The analysis will then turn to the constitutionality of these
programs in light of the fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and the athlete's right to privacy.
II. MANDATORY DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS FOR COLLEGE ATHLETES
A. The NCAA's Program
Since 1973, the NCAA has expressly prohibited the use of "danger-
ous drugs" in championship events. 16 However, such a prohibition
without an effective means of enforcement or deterrence amounts to
no prohibition at all. Despite various NCAA programs attempting to
educate athletes, coaches, and trainers on the adverse effects of drug
use,17 the prohibition in and of itself was ineffective. In 1984, the
NCAA finally recognized the need to test athletes for drugs in order
to prevent use and abuse in college athletics.18
It was not until the NCAA's 1986 convention, however, that its
member institutions adopted a drug testing program.19 This program
was designed to "safeguard the health and safety of participants"20
and to prevent student athletes from gaining an "artificially induced
advantage" 2 1 by using performance enhancing drugs such as steroids.
The program provides that each year, prior to participating in compe-
tition, the athlete must sign a consent form to be tested for certain
drugs proscribed by the NCAA.22 Apart from the drug testing pro-
gram, the NCAA also requires each athlete to sign a form known as
15. See generally, Clarke, supra note 3, at 741 (U.S. Olympic Committee); Drug
Banned That Masks Steroid Use, THE OLYMPIAN, Nov. 1987, at 41 (International Ama-
teur Athletic Federation); NCAA, THE 1987-88 NCAA DRUG TESTING MANUAL 111
(1987) (National Collegiate Athletic Association) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
16. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 111-12, Bylaw 5-2; Comment, Drugs, Ath-
letes, and the NCAA: A Proposed Rule for Mandatory Drug Testing in College Athlet-
ics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 210 (1984).
17. Comment, supra note 16, at 210-11.
18. Id. at 211 n.7.
19. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 29, Const. 3-9-(i); NCAA PROGRAM, supra
note 11, at 6-7. For a list of banned substances, see Appendix A to this Comment.
the Buckley Amendment Consent 23 which, among other things, gives
permission to release drug test results and sets forth recordation pro-
cedures.24 By signing the requisite forms, the athlete consents to be-
ing tested for drugs any time during the academic year; failure to
sign both consent forms results in ineligibility.25
The NCAA uses urinalysis to determine the presence of banned
substances.26 Athletes are typically tested immediately before or af-
ter NCAA championship events or postseason games.27 An athlete
selected for drug testing is required to furnish a urine specimen in
the presence of a monitor who ensures that the specimen is the ath-
lete's and has not been doctored.28 A detailed procedure is adhered
to throughout the collection stages to accurately identify the speci-
men and prevent it from being tampered with.29
Because a positive test result can lead to suspension of either an
individual athlete or an entire team, the NCAA provides a verifica-
tion and an appeals process.30 All positive tests are verified by a sec-
ond lab technician to ensure accuracy.3 ' If the verification confirms
the positive result, the athlete's institution is then notified and
within twenty-four hours, a second specimen is tested.3 2 At this
23. Under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Rights Act of 1974, a stu-
dent's educational records cannot be disclosed without his consent. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b), (d) (1974). The Buckley Amendment Consent authorizes disclosure of edu-
cational records, including results of drug tests, to authorized school representatives in
order to ascertain eligibility. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 6.
24. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 6.
25. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 29, Const. 3-9-(i).
26. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 11.
27. Although the protocol provided in the NCAA Drug Testing Program gives the
NCAA Committee discretion in determining the selection process, two methods are
typically employed: minutes played and performance. Id. at 13. During postseason
competition in sports such as football, the athletes having the most minutes of play
time are selected. For example, in football bowl games, the twenty-two players with
the most play time are tested along with 14 randomly selected reserves. Neff, Bosworth
Faces the Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 22. In individual sports, such as
track, athletes are selected for testing based on their performance vis-i-vis other ath-
letes. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 13. In addition to testing based on minutes
played or performance, the NCAA also tests athletes at random or those specifically
suspected of drug use. Id.
28. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 14. Examples of doctoring a specimen in-
clude: placing chemical substances under fingernails and releasing the substance into
the specimen; placing detergent or soap found in the bathroom into the specimen; en-
tering the bathroom with another's urine and substituting it for one's own; diluting the
urine with water from the toilet (the more diluted the specimen, the harder it is to
obtain an accurate reading of drugs present in the sample). NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON
DRUG ABUSE, URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 26 (Research Monograph Series
No. 73 1986) [hereinafter NIDA].
29. NCAA PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 14.
30. Id. at 16-18.
31. Id.
32. Id. Before sealing the specimen for shipment to the lab, the athlete is required
to separate the urine samples into two vials, A and B. Vial A is tested first. If a posi-
tive result is confirmed by two technicians, vial B is then tested. Id.
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stage, the athlete or a representative from, or on behalf of, the school
may witness the testing to verify the process and ensure that the
specimen is the athlete's. 33 The NCAA expressly provides that all
positive tests be confirmed during the second testing by gas chroma-
tography/mass spectrometry.34 A positive test of the second speci-
men will, at a minimum, result in the athlete's ineligibility during
postseason competition. 35 Upon regaining eligibility, the athlete will
lose one academic year of postseason eligibility if he again tests
positive.36
B. Drug Testing Program of a Public Institution
When the NCAA implemented its drug testing program accompa-
nied by strict sanctions, individual institutions recognized the need to
test for drug use during the regular season. Testing during post-
season competition neither protects players during the regular season
competition nor controls drug use among individuals or teams quali-
fying for postseason competition. By testing during the regular sea-
son, schools recognize that an athlete's drug problem can be
confronted before disqualification by the NCAA. As a result, many
universities have established their own drug testing programs.3 7
Although the objectives of most public university programs3 8 are
33. Id.
34. Id. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry are the most accurate drug testing
processes. NIDA, supra note 28, at 35. The results from the gas chromatography
phase of the test are confirmed during the mass spectrometry stage. Looney, A Test
With Nothing But Tough Questions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 9, 1982, at 24, 26; see
also NIDA, supra note 28, at 35, 36; Voy, supra note 4, at 20. However, because of its
high costs, gas chromatography/mass spectrometry is generally used only to confirm
positive results initially produced by urinalysis. For a detailed analysis of the various
methods of urinalysis, see generally NIDA, supra note 28; Comment, Drug Testing in
the Workplace: The Need For Quality Assurance Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 877, 878-
84 (1987).
35. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 111, Bylaw 5-2-(b). The program also pro-
vides for a hearing process to contest any sanctions; yet, "[t]he right to a hearing is the
institution's, not the student's." Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Aug. 10, 1988).
36. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 111, Bylaw 5-2-(b).
37. Comment, On Analysis of Public College Athlete Drug Testing Programs
Through the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 815 n.4 (1984). In 1987, 140 (26%) NCAA member institutions had drug
testing programs as compared to only 79 (10%) in 1985. NCAA DRUG EDUC. COMM.,
COMPARISON SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF DRUG-EDUCATION/TESTING SURVEY (1987)
[hereinafter NCAA SURVEY]; see supra note 38.
38. This comment uses the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) drug
testing policies as an example of those in effect at public universities in general. Since
the NCAA enacted its drug testing program, 140 member institutions have established
similar to the NCAA's goals of preventing unfair competition and
protecting the health and safety of athletes, 3 9 these programs are also
directed at assisting the athlete. Unlike the NCAA's program, uni-
versity drug testing programs are designed to provide counseling for
the athlete in order to help combat the drug problem.40
University guidelines parallel the NCAA's with one major excep-
tion: universities test athletes throughout the regular season, not just
during postseason competition.4 1 In order to participate on an inter-
collegiate team, the student athlete is required to sign a consent form
similar to the one required by the NCAA.42 The athlete's signature
constitutes an agreement to submit to drug testing, as described in
the athletic department's policy statement, as well as an agreement
to provide information on substances taken under medical supervi-
sion.43 Upon signing the consent form, the athlete is eligible to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate athletic programs.
As an intercollegiate team member, an athlete can be required to
undergo a urinalysis in two situations. First, prior to participation, a
preseason medical evaluation is required to ensure that the athlete is
physically capable of competing.44 During this examination a urine
specimen is taken and tested for signs of drug use by the athlete.45
Head coaches receive data on the number of samples testing positive
but are not given the names of those athletes testing positive.46 Indi-
viduals who test positive are notified, but are not sanctioned. Instead,
these athletes are offered the assistance of a counseling program47 on
a voluntary basis.48 Test results and counseling participation remain
confidential.49
Second, the athlete may be tested if randomly selected for testing
during the season.50 In addition, all athletes testing positive during
programs similar to UCLA's. NCAA SURVEY, supra note 37. For a comparison of
other public universities' drug testing programs, see Comment, The NCAA Declares
War: Student-Athletes Battle the Mandatory Drug Test, 16 CAP. U.L. REV. 673 (1987)
(utilizing Ohio State University's drug testing program).
39. DEPARTMENT OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, UNIV. OF CAL., LOS ANGELES,
POLICY STATEMENT DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING PROGRAM FOR UCLA STUDENT-
ATHLETES, (1987-88) (pamphlet) [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT]; see also NCAA PRO-
GRAM, supra note 11 and text accompanying notes 19-21.
40. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Interview with Dr. Judith Holland, Director of Women's Athletics, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles (Mar. 28, 1988) [hereinafter Interview].
45. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 39.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Each athlete's name corresponds to a 12-digit identification number. The
computer selects a single digit number and a position number. All athletes whose posi-
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their preseason medical examination will be retested at this time.5 '
If an athlete tests positive twice, participation in a counseling pro-
gram becomes mandatory.52 An athlete who refuses counseling for-
feits his eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics.5 3 Upon
testing positive the second time, the athlete's name is then divulged
to the coach.54 Unlike the NCAA's program, the university allows
the athlete to compete during the counseling program provided the
athlete does not pose any unreasonable hazard to himself or others
by competing.55
Suspension from the team will result only if the athlete tests posi-
tive a third time56 and may also include nonrenewal of athletic aid or
scholarships.57 A student athlete's eligibility may be reinstated upon
recommendation by medical personnel and agreement by the coach.58
However, conditions such as periodic testing may be imposed upon
the athlete to ensure compliance with school policies.5 9 Although
suspension does not occur unless the athlete's participation is unrea-
sonably hazardous or the athlete tests positive a third time, all posi-
tive results must still be verified. The student with good cause may
also request a hearing before the Senior Associate Athletic Director
prior to any sanction being imposed60 and any determinations made
at this hearing may be appealed to a committee appointed by the
Athletic Director.61
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION: STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
A. State Action Doctrines
To challenge the constitutionality of a program, statute, or regula-
tion at the state level, the action must come under the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment.6 2 The fourteenth amendment protects indi-
tion number is the same as the single digit number selected (i.e. the fifth number of
their identification number is nine) are tested. Interview, supra note 44.
51. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 39.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id,
55, Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. l&
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1948).
viduals against unwarranted governmental action, but it does not af-
ford protection against acts by other individuals or private
organizations. 63 Accordingly, an athlete who challenges the constitu-
tionality of a mandatory drug testing program must first establish
that the program is supported by state action. State action is present
when the state supports private actions or when the state itself is the
actor. In situations where the state is supporting activities by private
organizations, the key determination is whether the private conduct
can reasonably be attributed to the state. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized three theories of state action: (1) the
public function theory;64 (2) the entanglement theory;65 and (3) the
state regulation or encouragement theory.66
1. Public Function Theory
The state cannot escape constitutional scrutiny by authorizing pri-
vate individuals or entities67 to perform public functions. State ac-
tion occurs when a private entity performs an action which is
traditionally an "exclusive" function of the government.6 8 In Evans
v. Newton,69 the Supreme Court defined public functions as those
which "traditionally serve the community,"70 such as services pro-
vided by police and fire departments. Additionally, the state must be
required to provide the service in order for the private entity assum-
ing the duty to be considered a state actor.71 Subsequent to their de-
cision in Evans, the Court narrowed the definition of public function
such that private entities must now completely displace the govern-
ment when assuming the role of performing public functions.72 Be-
cause the government cannot escape the limits of the Constitution by
delegating a public function to a private entity, an individual can con-
63. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12-13 (1883). "With the exception of the
thirteenth amendment the Constitution is a restraint on governmental action and does
not provide one private citizen with rights against another." E. BARRETT & W. COHEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 966 (7th ed. 1985).
64. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
65. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961).
66. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
67. In this comment, "private entity" means any private organization or private
individual.
68. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. "If private actors assume the role of the state by en-
gaging in these governmental functions, then they subject themselves to the same limi-
tations on their freedom of action as would be imposed upon the state itself." R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 426 (1986) [hereinafter
ROTUNDA].
69. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
70. A park, even in the hands of a private trustee, cannot be maintained as a seg-
regated park because the services which it provides are "municipal in nature." Id. at
302.
71. Jackson, 419 U.S at 352-53.
72. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-59 & n.11 (1978).
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stitutionally challenge the activities of private actors assuming tasks
traditionally performed by the government.
2. Entanglement Theory
When the state substantially involves itself in a private entity's ac-
tions, the private conduct becomes state action and is restricted by
the Constitution.73 The rationale supporting this theory asserts that
state entanglement in private conduct forms a "symbiotic relation-
ship."74 Conduct emanating from this relationship is perceived by
the public as state action and, therefore, the Court attributes that
conduct to the state.75
The Court looks at several factors to determine whether a private
entity's actions are distinguishable from those of the state. One fac-
tor considered is the extent of physical and economic contacts shared
by the state and the private entity.76 In Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority,77 a private restaurant located in a public parking
structure was held to constitute state action. 78 The Court reasoned
that because the public parking structure could not have been fi-
nanced without rents collected from commercial enterprises such as
the restaurant,79 the physical and economic contacts were sufficient
to find state action.
A second factor is whether the private entity receives aid from or
is directly subsidized by the government.8 0 The Court in Norwood v.
Harrison8 1 held that a private school's conduct amounted to state ac-
tion because the school accepted textbooks from the government.8 2
When state instrumentalities are entwined with private conduct, as
exhibited by the Burton and Norwood cases, the acts of private enti-
ties are vicariously imposed upon the state.
73. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
74. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). A "symbiotic relation-
ship" arises when the government becomes so entwined in the conduct of the private
entity that the actions of the two (the private entity and the government) are indistin-
guishable. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at 438.
75. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at 440.
76. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24; ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at 438.
77. 365 U.S. 715.
78. Id. at 726.
79. Id. at 719.
80. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 458 (1973); ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at 438.
81. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
82. Id. at 463-68. The Court held that "provid[ing] tangible assistance to students
attending private schools" constituted direct governmental aid. Id.
3. State Encouragement Theory
Under the state encouragement theory, conduct of a private entity
is attributable to the state when the state has "exercised its coercive
power" and encouraged the challenged activity.8 3 A nexus arises be-
tween state and private activity when the government influences a
private entity's conduct.8 4 In Reitman v. Mulkey,85 the California
Supreme Court invalidated a state constitutional amendment estab-
lishing a "right to privately discriminate on grounds which admit-
tedly would be unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should
state action be involved."s6 The court held that the amendment en-
couraged discrimination and was thus state action.8 7
Although the encouragement theory is similar to the entanglement
theory, state action is more difficult to establish under the former.
Courts frequently refer to the encouragement theory when the acts
in question stem from a private entity licensed8 8 or regulated 9 by
the state. However, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,90 the Supreme
Court refused to recognize that merely licensing a private entity to
perform a specified function constitutes state action because the act
of licensing did not significantly involve the government in the pri-
vate entity's conduct or encourage the private entity's behavior.91
Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Douglas suggested that when
the state issues only a limited number of licenses, the issuance to a
private entity whose conduct violates a person's constitutional rights
may amount to state action.92
Two years later, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,93 the
Supreme Court's affirmation of Moose Lodge resolved any questions
raised by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion. The Court stated:
"The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not
by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment."94 The Court added that regulating a pri-
vate entity's conduct, who had been granted the status of a monopoly,
83. Lock & Jennings, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Student-Athlete Drug
Testing Programs: The Bounds of Privacy, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 581, 585 (1986).
84. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, at 431.
85. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
86. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 378-79.
88. Moose Lodge No. 107 v, Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972). A private club does not
become a state actor merely because the state issues it a license to serve alcohol. Id.
89. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974). A privately
owned and operated utility corporation is not a state actor despite being regulated by
the state. Id.
90. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
91. Id. at 176-77.
92. Id. at 182-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
94. Id. at 350.
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did not involve state action.9 5 Thus, even the granting of a monopoly
by the state, without greater state interaction, is not sufficient to
characterize the conduct of the private monopoly as state action.
IV. COLLEGE DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS-Is THERE STATE ACTION?
A. NCAA
To challenge the constitutionality of the NCAA's mandatory drug
testing program, it is necessary to establish that the NCAA's actions
are attributable to the state.96 Prior to 1984, courts followed the pub-
lic function and entanglement theories and held that NCAA activi-
ties constituted state action.97 However, in Parish v. NCAA,98 the
fifth circuit took an interesting approach by finding NCAA actions to
represent a government function because the court believed the gov-
ernment would step in to organize college athletics if the NCAA
ceased to exist.99
This determination in Parish was buttressed by the more common
interpretation of what is a government function, the public function
theory. The court reasoned that in conjunction with athletics, the
NCAA also regulates certain educational aspects of colleges and uni-
versities.1 00 Thus, because states have a "traditional interest" in the
education system, and because the NCAA was organized by educa-
tional institutions and not athletic departments, the court held that
the NCAA's actions reflected a traditional government function.101
Though Parish was affirmed in subsequent cases, not all courts
utilize the public function theory. For example, in Howard Univer-
sity v. NCAA,102 decided the same year as Parish, the court focused
on the character of NCAA members and found state action under the
entanglement theory.l0 3 The court found a symbiotic relationship to
95. Id at 350-52.
96. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
97. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1977);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510
F.2d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254
(9th Cir. 1974). But cf. McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625, 631 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
"The NCAA has an existence separate and apart from the educational system of any
state." Id.
98. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. Id, at 1033.
100. Id at 1032 n.11.
101. Id at 1032 & n.11.
102. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
103. Id at 216-20.
exist 0 4 since approximately fifty percent of NCAA membership is
comprised of federal and state funded institutions. 0 5 Therefore, the
court felt it was unnecessary for the government action to be exclu-
sively or directly that of the association before attributing the con-
duct to the state.106 In Howard University, the entanglement was
found to be present when governmental action was one of several
"co-operative forces."'1 7 Under both the public function and entan-
glement theories, NCAA actions are required to conform to the limi-
tations imposed upon the state by the Constitution. Recent court
decisions, however, have altered these traditional notions of state
action.
In the 1984 decision of Arlosoroff v. NCAA,108 the fourth circuit un-
dermined the required findings of the traditional public function and
government entanglement theories by effectively overruling cases at-
tributing the NCAA's actions to the state. 0 9 Rejection of the tradi-
tional public function theory in Arlosoroff was based upon two
separate grounds. First, the court interpreted Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn 110 to reject the premise that "indirect involvement of state gov-
ernments could convert what otherwise would be considered private
conduct into state action."1 1' Since all member institutions have an
equal voice in the politics of the NCAA,112 state institutions do not
play a more pervasive role than private ones, and the Arlosoroff
court found the presence of the state to constitute indirect involve-
ment.113 Thus, the mere fact that approximately one-half of the
NCAA is comprised of public institutions cannot in and of itself
render the NCAA a state actor.
Second, the court strictly interpreted Jackson to require that the
function assumed by a private entity be both traditionally and exclu-
104. Id. at 219-20.
105. Id. at 219.
106. Id.
107. Id,
108. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
109. Id.
110. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding private school not a state actor even though 90 to
99% of the' school's operating budget came from public funds).
111. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
112. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15.
113. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022; see also Barbay v. NCAA, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
393 (E.D. La.). The Barbay decision points out that:
Although the rules promulgated by the NCAA are followed by public, state-
subsidized institutions such as LSU, that fact alone does not require a finding
that the decision to promulgate the list of banned substances and the drug
testing procedures was the decision of the state. Under Rendell-Baker, state
regulation or subsidization of an institution will not create a § 1983 cause of
action without other evidence. There must be a further showing that the state
university caused or procured the adoption of the NCAA regulation in
question.
Id at 13.
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sively reserved for the state before being declared state action.' 1 4
Although the NCAA's regulations often overlap the educational as-
pects of college,"5 the primary function of the NCAA is to regulate
intercollegiate athletics.116 The state has never assumed this func-
tion, and despite the state being the most likely candidate to replace
the NCAA should it cease to exist, this fact alone is insufficient to
find state action."17
In addition to invalidating findings of state action based on the
public function theory, the court in Arlosoroff also rejected cases
holding the NCAA to be a state actor under the entanglement the-
ory.118 Although financial contributions by public institutions ac-
count for more than one-half of the NCAA's revenues," 9 the conduct
of the NCAA cannot be "fairly attributable to the state."12 0 The
court found that subsidies provided by state institutions did not "alter
the basic character of the NCAA as a voluntary association of public
and private institutions."'12 Moreover, because all members, both
private and state institutions, have an equal vote, state involvement
in the regulatory functions of the association did not compel the
adoption of the bylaws establishing the mandatory drug testing pro-
gram. Therefore, according to the Arlosoroff and Rendell-Baker deci-
sions, the NCAA is a private actor and thus, the constitutional
limitations on state conduct are not applicable to its mandatory drug
testing program. 122
B. In-House Programs
As with all entities whose conduct comes under constitutional scru-
tiny, state action must be found in an institution's own drug testing
114. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
115. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 n.ll (5th Cir. 1975). The NCAA condi-
tions eligibility on academic performance as well as physical capability. Id.; see NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 15, at 7, Const. 2-1-(c) (requiring that "eligibility rules... comply
with satisfactory standards of scholarship...").
116. See generally, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at 7, Const. 2-1.
117. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021.
118. Id. at 1022.
119. Id. at 1021.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. At the time of this writing, the United States Supreme Court had granted the
petition for certiorari filed in Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1011 (1988). At issue is whether the NCAA is a state actor such that
a coach, suspended by a member university in compliance with the NCAA's rules, can
challenge the suspension on due process grounds. Id.
program in order to successfully sustain a claim under the fourteenth
amendment.
1. Public Institutions
Since the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that providing public education is a traditional government func-
tion.123 Additionally, lower courts have also found state action by ap-
plying the entanglement theory.124 A public institution is considered
a state actor because the state elects or appoints a school's board of
regents whose functions include establishing rules, defining proce-
dures, and hiring faculty.125 As a state actor, the conduct of official
school representatives, such as athletic directors, must also be attrib-
uted to the state.126 Therefore, regulations such as the mandatory
drug testing of athletes must comply with constitutional restrictions.
2. Private Institutions
Unlike public education, providing private education is not held to
be a traditional government function.127 Unless the court can estab-
lish that the state provides financial support or regulates the school
such that the state actually compels the challenged conduct, state ac-
tion does not exist.128 Therefore, mandatory drug testing programs
created by private institutions cannot be challenged under the four-
teenth amendment.12 9
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
A. Application of the Fourth Amendment
The Constitution of the United States expressly guarantees "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "'13 The
fourth amendment, made applicable to the states by virtue of the
123. "Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of the state."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). "Public education, like the police func-
tion, fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency."
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
124. Lock & Jennings, supra note 83, at 586.
125. Id.
126. Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D.N.H. 1976); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.
Supp. 777, 784 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
127. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
128. See supra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
129. However, drug testing programs can be challenged under a state constitution
which does not require state action, such as California's. Hill & McKeever v. NCAA,
No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988). For instance, the right of privacy granted by
Article 1, section 1 of California's Constitution "protects against intrusion by both pri-
vate and governmental entities." Id, at 24; see also Schmidt v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.
3d 1060, 742 P.2d 209, 240 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1982).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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fourteenth amendment,131 guarantees that individuals are protected
against "arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."'1 32 While
fourth amendment challenges were traditionally made in connection
with police conduct, 33 the Supreme Court has since held that the
fourth amendment reaches conduct of all government officials acting
in an official capacity.134 Therefore, a finding of state action is suffi-
cient to invoke the protection of the fourth amendment.
However, before being cloaked with fourth amendment protection,
the injured party must establish that: (1) a search and seizure was
conducted by a state official without a warrant; (2) the search was
unreasonable; and (3) the state official did not procure the injured
party's consent. 135 This section will analyze whether the student ath-
letes can successfully challenge mandatory drug testing programs
conducted by the state on fourth amendment grounds.
1. Search and Seizure
The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable intrusions
upon the human body.'3 6 In Schmerber v. California,3 7 the defend-
ant challenged the constitutionality of a blood sample extracted at
the request of a police officer while the defendant was unconscious in
order to establish his blood-alcohol level.138 Upon review, the
Supreme Court held that the intrusion into the defendant's person
constituted a search and seizure 3 9 and therefore, the constraints of
the fourth amendment applied.140
When confronted with the question of whether a urine sample con-
stitutes a search, courts have analogized a urinalysis to an involun-
tary extraction of blood141 since both involve an intrusion into the
131. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985).
133. Id. at 334-35.
134. Id. at 335.
135. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
136. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
137. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
138. Id. at 758.
139. "Seizure of an individual, within the Fourth Amendment, connotes the taking
of one physically or constructively into custody and detaining him .. " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979).
140. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 776-78.
141. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn
v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539
(6th Cir. 1988); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 386
(E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert granted, 108 S. Ct, 1072
(1988).
person's body. Courts have further held that taking a urine sample is
a search under the fourth amendment even "[t]hough urine, unlike
blood, is routinely discharged from the body so that no actual intru-
sion is required for its collection, [because] it is normally discharged
and disposed of under circumstances that merit protection from arbi-
trary interference." 142 Therefore, under mandatory state drug test-
ing programs, a search and seizure occurs when the student athlete is
required to produce a urine specimen.
2. Reasonableness of the Search
Despite the occurrence of an unwarranted search, the urinalysis
procedure is not automatically held unconstitutional unless the intru-
sion into the person's body is unreasonable. 143 Although reasonable-
ness depends upon the context surrounding the search,144 no exact
parameters of what is reasonable have been established. 145 Instead,
the courts apply a balancing test to determine whether the state's in-
terest in conducting the search outweighs the intrusion produced by
the search.146 If the state's interest prevails, the search is found to be
reasonable.
When public universities established drug testing programs, they
had two goals in mind. First, they believed that testing for drugs
would deter athletes from using dangerous substances and thereby
protect student health and safety.147 This belief included a reaffir-
mation that in order to prevent drug use, the athletes needed to be
educated on its harmful side effects. Second, the ideal of equitable
competition was promoted by ensuring that no athlete would legally
have an "artificially induced advantage."'148
While legitimate interests support the universities' programs,149
these interests must be weighed against the invasion of the student
142. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
144. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513.
145. "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is con-
ducted." I&
146. Id.
147. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
148. Id
149. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd,
1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12354 (9th Cir. 1988). "We reverse the district court's order de-
nying the motion to remand this case to state court. We remand the action to the dis-
trict court with directions that the court remand the entire case back to the state court
from which it was removed." 1988 WL 92211 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Be-
cause the district court's ruling was reversed only on jurisdictional grounds, the opin-
ion is still persuasive as to the constitutional issues.
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athlete's rights. The courts must determine the intrusiveness of the
search based upon an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy
and the reasonableness of the circumstances surrounding the
search.150 In Katz v. United States,151 the Supreme Court established
a two-pronged test in analyzing the legitimacy of an individual's pri-
vacy expectations. First, the person must have a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy.152 Second, the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy must be recognized as reasonable by society.153
The first prong of the Katz test is satisfied by the initiation of the
constitutional challenge itself. An individual not having an expecta-
tion of privacy in the production of a urine specimen will not be chal-
lenging the constitutionality of urinalysis procedures. The second
prong of the test is evaluated by determining society's views on the
reasonableness of the intrusion. Since even public restroom facilities
provide individual stalls for privacy, the act of urinating is tradition-
ally considered a private act.lM Therefore, requiring a student athlete
to urinate in the presence of another party is highly intrusive.
However, the intrusiveness of urinalysis alone does not render the
search unconstitutional. An additional factor to consider is whether
the intrusiveness of the search outweighs the state's interests in con-
ducting the search in light of the surrounding circumstances. The
state's interests in detecting drug use will outweigh the intrusion
upon the athlete's privacy expectations if the state can establish that:
(1) the search was "justified at its inception" and (2) the search "was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.l 155
A search is "justified at its inception" when the party conducting it
has reasonable grounds, based upon objective facts, for suspecting
that the search will reveal evidence of a violation.156 Mandatory drug
testing of athletes is reasonable under two circumstances. First, test-
ing is reasonable if the party conducting it specifically suspects drug
150. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
151. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
152. Id. at 361, (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986). The individ-
ual has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in [his] urine until the decision is made to
flush the urine down the toilet and the urine is actually flushed down the toilet." Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986),
vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
155. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
156. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985); McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122, 1130 (D.C. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modifed, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
use,157 and that suspicion is directed toward the student being
tested.158 Second, an entire group of similarly-situated athletes may
be tested if a significant number of unidentifiable individuals among
the group are suspected of using drugs.159 However, in Capua v. City
of Plainfield,160 the court noted a problem with group testing in that
"it casually sweeps up the innocent with the guilty" and forces the
innocent party to "submit to a highly intrusive urine test in order to
vindicate his or her innocence."161 This runs contrary to the Ameri-
can legal system which is premised on the belief that an individual is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Drug testing programs conducted by public universities may not
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Two situations frequently arise in
which a collegiate athlete may be tested and each must be examined
separately. The first analysis involves drug tests conducted during
preseason medical examinations, whereas the second analysis is trig-
gered by random drug testing during the regular season.
The constitutionality of preseason drug testing was addressed in
Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School District.162
The New Jersey Superior Court in Odenheim held that requiring
high school students to submit to urinalysis during a mandatory
physical examination for the purpose of detecting drug use was un-
constitutional.163 Although upholding the constitutionality of medi-
cal examinations performed to protect the health and safety of both
student athletes and those coming in contact with them, the court
found that drug testing was "not reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which initially justified the interference." 6 4 Because
the school possessed less intrusive means to deal with drug use, the
inclusion of drug tests along with preseason physical examinations vi-
olated a student's fourth amendment rights as well as the right of
privacy.
In contrast to Odenheim, the United States District Court in
O'Halloran v. University of Washington165 held constitutional a
drug testing program implemented by the university which included
an annual testing of all collegiate athletes.16 6 The court found that
157. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516; Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875,
880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), off'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Hill & McKeever v. NCAA,
No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988).
158. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1516; Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 880.
159. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
160. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
161. Id. at 1517.
162. 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
163. Id at 713.
164. Id,
165. 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12354 (9th Cir.
1988).
166. Id, at 998.
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the public's interest in preserving the integrity of college athletics,
coupled with the institution's interest in protecting the students'
health and safety, outweighed the slight intrusion produced by the
search.167 The court studied the initial intrusion created by a re-
quired preseason medical examination and held:
The health of participants in vigorous sports activities is of primary impor-
tance to the university and the student athlete, so it follows that health exam-
inations should be very routine. Certainly in the context of health
examinations, viewing and touching is tolerated among relative strangers that
would be firmly rejected, to say the least, in other contexts. While provision
of a urine sample is not extraordinary in an ordinary health examination, wit-
nessing the act is. Nevertheless, in the context of a university's athletic pro-
gram where student health is a primary interest, monitored urination to
preserve the integrity of the urine sample taken as part of an announced pro-
gram to foster education and deterrence of drug misuse and abuse does not
constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
1 6 8
O'Halloran supports the constitutionality of public university drug
programs which test athletes during their preseason medical exami-
nation. 69 Therefore, based upon the O'Halloran court's analysis,
drug testing by a public university during a medical examination,
designed to determine the athlete's fitness and ability to safely par-
ticipate in competition, is constitutional.
The second phase of analysis involves the constitutionality of ran-
domly testing athletes during the regular season. Courts have contin-
ually held that randomly testing individuals is a fourth amendment
violation. 70 Unless the university can point to articulable facts
showing a reasonable and individualized suspicion of drug use by a
particular athlete, an individual cannot be required to submit to a
random drug test.1 7 ' A reasonable, individualized suspicion exists if
an athlete tests positive for drugs in a previous legitimate test.
Therefore, random drug testing by universities during the regular
season is unconstitutional except when applied to those athletes pre-
viously testing positive for drug use.
3. Consent
Assuming that a mandatory drug testing program is considered un-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 997.
170. Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd,
846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517
(D.NJ. 1986); McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (D.C. Iowa 1985), aff'd as
modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
reasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, the search is nevertheless
valid if consent is given.' 72 Simply signing a consent form, however,
does not amount to a "blanket waiver" of all fourth amendment
rights.173 Only by consenting to a reasonable search can an individ-
ual waive rights guaranteed under the fourth amendment. 74 In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,175 the Supreme Court ruled that in order
for a consent to be valid,
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be co-
erced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For no
matter how subtly the coercion were applied, the resulting 'consent' would be
no more than a pretext for the unjustified . .. intrusion against which the
Fourth Amendment is directed.1 76
Voluntariness is "an individual's ability to choose between alterna-
tives."'177 However, the alternatives must be viable to avoid a coerced
consent.' 78 For example, an employer who rejects a union's contract
proposal and watches his employees strike has made a voluntary, yet
hard decision. In contrast, the choice between performing an act or
dying constitutes coercion, since death is not a viable alternative. Be-
ing forced to make difficult decisions is not an involuntary decision
and does not constitute coercion. Therefore, a party who is forced to
choose between distasteful alternatives has voluntarily made the de-
cision although the choice was difficult.'79
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,180 the district
court carved an exception to the opinion that hard choices are never-
theless voluntary decisions. In Von Raab, the District Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of the United States Customs Service
drug testing plan.181 Customs Service workers seeking promotion to
specific positions enumerated in the plan were required to submit to
urinalysis. 8 2 The plan was less intrusive than those employed by
public universities since direct monitor observation was not re-
quired.18 3 However, promotion was conditioned upon the worker's
consent to be tested in a similar manner to intercollegiate athletes
who are tested before being eligible for competition. 8 4 The district
court in Von Raab held that a worker's consent was involuntary
172. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
173. McDonnell, 612 F. Supp. at 1131.
174. Id.; see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
175. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
176. Id. at 228.
177. Comment, supra note 37, at 824.
178. Id. at 825.
179. Id.
180. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 382.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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where failure to consent resulted in losing employment and govern-
ment benefits.'8 5 Although the foregoing alternatives appear more vi-
able than the choice of life or death, the court found that when
failure to consent to drug testing results in an individual's loss of a
property right, the decision to forego that right is not a viable
alternative.186
Five months after the Von Raab court granted a permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting the Customs Service from testing its employees for
drugs, the United States Court of Appeals vacated the injunction. 187
The appellate court held that the testing program was reasonable,
and therefore, not a. violation of the employee's fourth amendment
rights. 88 Contrary to the district court's decision, the court of ap-
peals held that the employee's consent was voluntary.189 The court's
rationale was twofold: (1) the employee is voluntarily seeking em-
ployment in a "covered position" and (2) the employee's current posi-
tion is not jeopardized if after applying for a transfer, he later decides
to forego the drug test.190 Therefore, the consent is not coerced and
is not a violation of the employee's fourth amendment rights.
Mandatory drug testing programs involving student athletes are
similar to the Customs Service drug testing provisions. In order to
participate in intercollegiate athletics, the athlete is required to sign
two consent forms, the NCAA's "Drug-testing Consent" form and a
university consent form.91 However, unlike the employees of the
Customs Service who retain their positions if they refuse to consent
to testing, if the athlete refuses to sign either form, eligibility to com-
pete is lost. For many athletes, the loss of eligibility results in revo-
cation of scholarships which may deny the athlete a college
education.192 Athletes, especially those on scholarship, have "a prop-
erty right of present economic value at stake."'193 Because the athlete
is distinguishable from the employee in Von Raab, the district court's
185. Id. at 388.
186. Id. at 390-91.
187. 816 F.2d at 178.
188. Id. at 180-81. The Customs Service is justified in testing employees who seek
employment in "covered positions." "Covered positions" include jobs where the em-
ployee (1) is "directly involve[d] [in] the interdiction of illicit drugs," (2) is required to
carry a firearm, or (3) has access to classified information. Id. at 178.
189. Id. at 178.
190. Id. at 173.
191. See supra notes 24-25, 42-43 and accompanying text.
192. Comment, supra note 37, at 826; see also Comment, supra note 16, at 224-25.
193. Comment, supra note 37, at 826. But see Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034
(5th Cir. 1975).
analysis of the consent to drug testing should be utilized. Under this
rationale, a scholarship athlete choosing between sustaining economic
loss or giving consent is not faced with viable alternatives. There-
fore, an athlete's decision to consent is coerced and thus invalid.
Another means of invalidating an athlete's consent is premised on
the parties' bargaining positions. In Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, 194 the
court recognized that "any constitutional right may be waived or bar-
gained away as a result of free bargaining."19 5 However, the court
found the NCAA to be a monopoly such that the student is placed at
a disadvantage and since no other regulatory body exists, the student
must waive his rights in order to compete in intercollegiate athlet-
ics. 1 96 Accordingly, the court held:
'Consent' to drug testing in these circumstances is a fiction. There is no equal
bargaining between the athletes and the NCAA. Without free and equal bar-
gaining the theoretical underpinnings of contract law vitiated [sic]. [Citations
omitted.] Thus, while a negotiated consent to drug testing may be accepted as
a reasonable intrusion, the consent to testing given by student athletes in this
case does not render the testing program a reasonable invasion of privacy.
1 97
Therefore, based on Hill & McKeever, a student athlete's consent is
not a valid waiver of his constitutional rights.
VI. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Privacy Rights of Individuals
The Constitution does not expressly guarantee an individual's right
of privacy. Since 1891, however, the Supreme Court "has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."'1 98 Although an
individual's fundamental right of privacy is recognized in relation to
family interests,19 9 the Court has been reluctant to extend that right
to one's own body.20 0 In 1986, however, the right of privacy was ex-
194. No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988). Two student athletes at Stanford
University challenged the NCAA's drug testing program under California's Constitu-
tion. Id, The ruling was limited to Stanford athletes, but because of the ramifications
of this decision, the NCAA will most likely file an appeal.
195. Id at 6.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 7.
198. Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). The Supreme Court has
recognized that the right of privacy exists in the Constitution through the first, fourth,
and fifth amendments as well as in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and the ninth
amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Court has also utilized the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty to find a right of privacy. Id.
199. Roe, 410 U.S. 413 (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 1029 (1972) (contra-
ception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child
rearing and education).
200. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy constitutional and not violative of a fundamental right of the defendant); see
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panded to include nonfamilial situations in National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab.201 In Von Raab, the district court held
that the Customs Service drug testing plan violated a worker's consti-
tutional right of privacy.
The Court finds that the Customs Directive detracts from the dignity of each
Customs worker covered under the plan and invades the right of privacy such
workers have under the United States Constitution. Excreting bodily wastes
is a very personal bodily function normally done in private; it is accompanied
by a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the process and the product.
The Customs Directive unconstitutionally interferes with the privacy rights of
the Customs workers.
2 0 2
When an individual asserts an infringement upon his constitutional
right to privacy, the state must show that a compelling interest exists
which justifies limiting the individual's rights.203 The state must also
establish that the "legislative enactments [were] narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake."204 Invasions of
privacy, such as the one created by a public institution's drug testing
program, have been upheld on the basis that the intrusion was "nec-
essary to protect the health and safety of the general public." 205 Pro-
tecting the public's health, safety, welfare, and morals is within the
police power of the state2 06 and exercising this power is always a le-
gitimate state interest 2 0 7 which may rise to the level of a compelling
state interest.2 08 Therefore, states can infringe upon a person's fun-
damental right of privacy to preserve the health and safety of the
public, provided that the intrusion is the least restrictive means
available.2O9
In Handel v. Shoemaker,2 10 the constitutionality of a New Jersey
also Gillow, Compulsory Urinalysis of Public School Students: An Unconstitutional
Search and Seizure, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 111, 113 n.10 (1986).
201. 649 F. Supp. 380, 389 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
202. Id. In vacating the district court's permanent injunction against the Customs
Service, the court of appeals did not have the opportunity to discuss the employee's
right to privacy; the union did not use this argument as a basis for supporting the in-
junction. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 181.
203. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
204. Id.
205. Comment, supra note 16, at 228; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
206. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926).
207. Id. at 372-73.
208. Fundamental rights, including an individual's right of privacy, can only be re-
stricted if the state can show a compelling interest in doing so. Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
209. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
210. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
Racing Commission regulation allowing stewards to test jockeys,
trainers, and grooms for alcohol and drugs was challenged. The court
of appeals found that the horse racing industry needed to be highly
regulated in order to protect the wagering public who relies on its in-
tegrity.211 The court recognized the jockey's right of privacy regard-
ing the invasion of his body and the medical information revealed by
the drug test.212 However, the court held that substance abuse by
jockeys negatively affected the integrity of the industry, and there-
fore, the state had a strong interest in protecting the wagering pub-
lic. 213 Because the test results were protected against unauthorized
disclosure, the regulation was upheld.
B. Privacy Rights of Student Athletes-Are Mandatory
Drug Tests an Invasion?
Although students are subject to the rules and regulations of their
university, enrolling at an institution does not waive the student's
constitutional rights.21 4 University students are afforded the same
constitutional rights as any other adult,215 and thus, the fundamental
right of privacy is not diminished by attending college.
When analyzing a public university's drug testing program, it is im-
portant to delineate the differences between testing student athletes
and testing other individuals such as jockeys. Unlike the highly regu-
lated horse racing industry, intercollegiate athletics are not regulated
by the state.216 Because the state does not regulate college athletics,
the student athlete's expectation of privacy is not diminished. There-
fore, according to the court's decision in Von Raab, there must be a
compelling state interest which is accomplished through the least in-
trusive means in order for a public university's mandatory drug pro-
gram to pass constitutional muster.
While drug tests have been held constitutional on the grounds that
they are essential to protecting the public's perceived integrity of ath-
letic competition, 217 a university's interest in drug testing is unique in
that it is not directed at public perception. The primary interests of
collegiate drug policies are twofold: (1) the university is seeking to
protect the student athlete from the harmful effects of drugs and
211. Id. at 1138. Regulation of the industry reduces a jockey's expectation of pri-
vacy and neither a warrant nor consent is needed to perform the search. Id. at 1142.
212. Id. at 1144.
213. Id. at 1142.
214. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 785 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
215. Id.; see also Gillow, supra note 200, at 119-20.
216. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984).
217. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
See also Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 180-81 (drug testing was necessary to protect the integ-
rity of the Customs Service because the employees in "covered positions" are involved
in enforcing drug smuggling laws).
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(2) the university is fighting to maintain equitable competition. 218
Although the school's interests are limited to student athletes, the
Supreme Court has recognized the state's need to attack a public
problem, such as drug abuse, in a piecemeal fashion.219
Regulations designed to curb drug use among athletes must be nar-
rowly tailored to fulfill legitimate state interests. Randomly selecting
athletes to be tested is not the least intrusive means to detect drug
abuse and poses several problems. First, the program presumes all
athletes guilty until proven innocent by requiring them to forego
their right of privacy and submit to urinalysis. The least intrusive
means to combat the drug problem and protect the health of student
athletes would be testing only those athletes suspected of drug use.
Another problem associated with random testing is the manner in
which information acquired from the test results is disseminated.
The athlete's fundamental right of privacy encompasses all informa-
tion concerning his body.220 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recog-
nizes an individual's privacy right in medical information.221 A
public university's drug testing program should contain explicit pro-
visions stipulating methods of disclosure in order to keep results con-
fidential and protect the privacy rights of the athlete. Effective
methods of disclosure are essential because of the publicity that ath-
letes appearing in postseason competitions attract.222
VII. PROPOSAL FOR A DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
FOR COLLEGE ATHLETES
Although the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing programs
in college athletics may legitimately be attacked, it is difficult to ar-
gue with the policies behind such programs and the intentions of the
218. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
219. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
220. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); see also Re-
cent Developments-Constitutional Law: The Fourth Amendment and Drug Testing in
the Workplace, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 762, 764 (1987).
221. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
222. The absence of a starting player is not as noticeable during the regular season
compared to the athlete's absence during postseason competition. Interview, supra
note 44. During the regular season, students are unable to compete for various undis-
closed reasons, such as academic ineligibility or injury. Id. However, the absence of a
starting player during postseason competition receives much publicity. Neff, supra
note 27; see also Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988)
at 11. "It is virtually impossible to avoid media attention and speculation whenan
otherwise eligible student is declared ineligible for a bowl game or championship com-
petition because of a positive drug test." Id.
NCAA and individual institutions. Drug use and abuse is a wide-
spread problem facing all aspects of society, not just sports. Universi-
ties are providing an integral service to athletes by educating them
on the hazards of drug use and abuse and providing counseling to
those athletes already involved with drugs. In 1988, the NCAA's
postseason testing combined with the National Football League's
scouting tests revealed a decline in the number of college football
players testing positive for drugs.223 It is therefore essential to main-
tain testing, but guidelines must be established to protect the ath-
lete's constitutional rights. This comment proposes a drug testing
program able to pass constitutional muster.
Since the key factor in determining constitutionality is whether the
state's interests outweigh the invasion of the athlete's rights,22 4 it is
important that the program specifically state the testing institution's
goals and interests. Legitimate interests include protecting the ath-
lete's health and safety as well as maintaining fair and equitable com-
petition.225 However, such recognized interests are not sufficient in
and of themselves to tip the scales in favor of the state. Athletes
must also have notice of both the testing procedures as well as the
types of substances which will trigger positive test results. Only sub-
stances affecting the athlete's health and safety or those enhancing
performance should be tested; otherwise, the student athlete may ar-
gue that the testing procedures have no rational relation to the inter-
ests of the state.226
In addition, the program must be implemented in a fashion which
best facilitates the state's goals. Because athletes are becoming more
skilled at establishing patterns of drug use which elude detection by
urinalysis, testing must occur throughout the regular season as well
as postseason competition. One particular flaw of the NCAA's pro-
gram is that it tests only those athletes or teams who excel in their
sport.227 This number is relatively small considering the total
223. L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 1988, § III, at 6, col. 2. Statistics are unavailable to show
whether the implementation of testing actually produced the decrease in positive test
results, or whether players learned how far in advance they could use drugs without
testing positive. Id.
224. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
225. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1007 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd,
1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12354 (9th Cir. 1988).
226. Id. All substances contained in Appendix A are performance enhancing.
"[T]he classes of drugs banned are 'misused or abused in sport primarily for the pur-
pose of improving performance .. .all the drugs which are banned provoke adverse
effects and untoward reactions which may be detrimental to a student-athlete's pres-
ent and future health.'" Id. at 1006. But see Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 at
16-18 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988) (substances banned by NCAA do not enhance
performance).
227. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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number of competitors in intercollegiate athletics.228 Testing all ath-
letes after every competition would best achieve the desired results
but would be unfeasible. 229 Even testing all athletes at least once
during their season is not feasible since such tests are expensive and
only a limited number of laboratories are equipped to adequately
handle urinalysis. 230 Therefore, the best method of selecting which
athlete to subject to urinalysis is by choosing those athletes reason-
ably suspected of individualized drug use.
According to the courts, establishing individualized suspicion is not
as difficult as it appears, and searches based upon suspicion have
been recognized as constitutional. 23 ' The intrusiveness of a search is
minimized when the state can establish a reasonable basis for its
need to conduct a search of a specific individual.232 In the Capua de-
cision, the court noted: "Certainly one so under the influence of
drugs as to impair the performance of his or her duties must manifest
some outward symptoms which, in turn, would give rise to reason-
able suspicion." 233 In reality, however, it is almost impossible to de-
termine whether an athlete is taking drugs.234 Even if recognizing
those athletes using drugs was impossible, an individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy cannot be jeopardized absent a compelling
state interest.235 Therefore, it is better to let an athlete using drugs
go undetected than intrude on his constitutional rights.
In addition to a constitutional selection process, the method of col-
228. The University of Washington has 698 athletes competing in intercollegiate
athletics. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 999. There are approximately 800 member insti-
tutions of the NCAA. Karmanos v. University of Mich., 816 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir.
1987).
229. Testing all student athletes would be constitutional because "there are reason-
able grounds for believing that urine tests of student-athletes will turn up evidence of
misconduct-inappropriate drug use." O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
230. NIDA, supra note 28; see also, Neff, supra note 27, at 23.
231. See supra note 174.
232. Gilow, supra note 200, at 124-25.
233. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986).
234. "[T]here is a 'practical impossibility of detecting by observation alone the use
of anabolic steroids, depressants and even stimulants in most cases.'" O'Halloran, 679
F. Supp. at 1007) (quoting Professor Dugal, International Olympic Committee Medical
Commission member). But see Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 at 23 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988). "There are factors which can give rise to a clinical suspicion
of use of anabolic steroids, including large increases in weight over a short period of
time, aggressive behavior, pimples, body odor, changing hair patterns and others." Id.;
Comment, Random Urinalysis: Violating the Athlete's Individual Rights?, 30 How.
L.J. 93, 95 (1987). "An athlete's use of drugs is likely to result in irregular attendance
at practices and games, in sub-par performance due to impaired reflexes, coordination
and endurance ...... Id
235. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
lecting the urine specimen must include constitutional safeguards.
Requiring an athlete to urinate in the presence of another person
prevents any doctoring of the sample. Yet, such a collection process
also violates the athlete's right of privacy.23 6 However, an unadulter-
ated urine sample can be obtained by less intrusive means without
jeopardizing the athlete's right to privacy. For instance, a clean sam-
ple can be obtained if the bathroom is sanitized.2 37 To prevent, the
athlete from bringing another person's urine into the bathroom, a
monitor of the same sex may pat down the athlete's outer clothing to
detect any concealed containers.238 By eliminating the monitoring of
the collection process, the intrusion is minimized, thereby protecting
the athlete's privacy rights.
Finally, it is essential that the program provide an appeals process
as well as effective sanctions. Because of the possibility of a false
positive result, an athlete testing positive must be given the opportu-
nity to have his sample retested by a different method, preferably gas
chromotography/mass spectrometry. Only after confirmation of the
positive test result should the athlete be sanctioned. However,
merely punishing the athlete by suspending eligibility does not fully
achieve the state's goals. The state should make counseling and reha-
bilitation programs available to the athlete. Otherwise, the state's in-
terest in protecting the athlete's health and safety is not fostered.
Since athletic ineligibility will not always encourage athletes to
change their habits, those capable of participation should be allowed
to continue competing on the condition that they also take part in a
counseling or rehabilitation program. By conditioning eligibility in
this manner, athletes are more likely to stop using drugs. Loss of eli-
gibility alone is not the solution because it places the athlete outside
the control of the athletic department's drug testing and counseling
programs. Although it is important to keep the athlete involved in
the athletic program, stricter sanctions, such as suspension, must be
utilized if the athlete continues to use drugs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the NCAA's drug testing program is diffi-
cult to challenge under the federal constitution because the current
judicial trend is that the NCAA is a private entity, and not a state
actor. Therefore, the NCAA need not conform to the constitutional
limitations imposed upon state action by the fourteenth amendment.
236. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
237. Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 at 2-3, 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988).
238. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). A limited search, conducted by patting
down the individual's outer clothing, is not intrusive when there exists reasonable sus-
picion that the individual is concealing something. Id,
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Like the NCAA, private universities need not be concerned with the
constitutionality of their programs under the state action doctrine
since they are not state actors. However, the NCAA drug testing
program, as well as private institutions' programs may be challenged
under a state constitution not requiring state action.239
Meanwhile, public universities, as state actors, must mold their
drug testing programs to conform to the Constitution. Based upon
cases involving drug testing in the workplace, the random testing as-
pect of public university programs violates an individual's constitu-
tional rights. Although the interests which support testing are
legitimate, an individual's constitutional rights should not be
sacrificed.
The threat posed by the widespread use of drugs is real and the need to
combat it manifest. But it is important not to permit fear and panic to over-
come our fundamental principles and protections. A combination of interdic-
tion, education, treatment, and supply eradication will serve to reduce the
scourge of drugs, but even a reduction in the use of drugs is not worth a re-
duction in our most cherished constitutional rights.
The public interest in eliminating drugs in the workplace [and in college
athletics] is substantial, but to invade the privacy of the innocent in order to
discover the guilty establishes a dangerous precedent; one which our Constitu-
tion mandates be rejected.2 4 0
ALLISON ROSE
239. Hill & McKeever v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1988).
Although the current ruling applies only to Stanford athletes, future decisions ren-
dered on appeal could affect all California institutions. Telephone interview with
Mary Ann Seawell, Stanford University News Service (Aug. 25, 1988). This case will
most likely be appealed because of the radical effect it will have on drug testing pro-
grams in both public and private universities, as well as the NCAA.
240. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1522 (D.N.J. 1986).
APPENDIX A
NCAA BANNED DRUG CLASSES
1987-88
The following is a list of banned substances as printed in the 1987-
88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program as enacted by Executive Regulation
1-7-(b).
(1) Psychomotor and central nervous system stimulants:
amiphenazole
amphetamine
bemignoe r
benzphetamine r
caffeine
chlorphentermine I
cocaine
cropropamide I
crothetamide
diethylpropion I
dimethylamphetamine
doxapram
ethamivan
ethylamphetamine s
fencamfamine (
(2) Sympathomimetic amines:
clorprenaline
ephedrine r
etafedrine
isotharine
isoprenaline t(
(3) Anabolic steroids:
clostebol r
dehydrochlormethyl- c
testosterone 0
fluoxymesterone 0
mesterolone s
methenolone t
methandienone
nandrolone (
(4) Substances banned for specific sports:
Rifle:
alcohol
atenolol
metroprolol t
nadolol (
(5) Diuretics:
acetazolamide
bendroflumethiazide r
benzthiazide
bumetanide
chlorothiazide c
chlorthalidone s
ethacrynic acid
flumethiazide t
neclofenoxate
nethylamphetamine
nethylphenidate
iikethamide
iorpseudoephedrine
emoline
)entetrazol
)hendimetrazine
)henmetrazine
hentermine
)icrotoxine
ipradol
rolintane
trychnine
AND RELATED
'OMPOUNDS
soprenaline
nethoxyphenamine
nethylephedrine
phenylpropanolamine
ND RELATED
COMPOUNDS
norethanddrolone
)xandrolone
)xymesterone
xymetholone
tanozolol
estosterone
AND RELATED
COMPOUNDS
pindolol
ropranolol
imolol
ND RELATED
'OMPOUNDS
iydroflumethiazide
nethyclothiazide
netolazone
polythiazide
iuinethazone
pironolactone
triamterene
richlormethiazide
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furosemide
hydrochlorothiazide
(6) Street drugs:
amphetamine
cocaine
heroin
AND RELATED
COMPOUNDS
marijuana
methamphetamine
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol)
OTHERS

